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This paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country 
receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 128 
countries over the period 1972-1998. Our results, based on Extreme Bounds Analysis, suggest 
that it are mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while 
most  political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement 
are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related 
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1. Introduction  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created toward the end of World War II. One of 
its main objectives is to help governments resolve temporary balance of payments problems. 
At present 184 countries are members of the IMF and eligible to take out loans from the Fund. 
However, not all borrowing is automatic. At a certain level of borrowing, a government must 
commit to adjustment programs in exchange for access to IMF funds (Mussa and Savastano, 
2000).  
How does the IMF decide on its lending? Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF states that the activities of the Fund should, among other things, “facilitate the expansion 
and balanced growth of international trade” and “promote exchange stability”. In other words, 
one should expect IMF lending to be based on mainly economic considerations. Indeed, 
various studies, many of which will be reviewed in the present paper, find that the chance that 
a country receives IMF support depends on the economic situation in the country concerned. 
Notably variables like a country’s reserve position, its debt service, and its real growth rate 
are often found to be important determinants of the likelihood that a country receives IMF 
credit.  
However, it would be hard to deny that—at least to some extent—political-economic 
factors may also play a role in the Fund’s lending decisions. As the Financial Times reports, 
this view is shared by the new managing director of the IMF, who regards the IMF “primarily 
as a political institution”, in which “technical analysis must play a secondary role to politics”.
1 
In his recent discussion of the debate on the IMF, Willett (2001, p. 595) even argues that “in a 
number of instances the IMF has been forced to abandon its economic principles in order to 
do the political bidding of its major shareholders, the governments of the United States and 
the other industrial countries.” Indeed, Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2002) report 
evidence suggesting that access to IMF funds is skewed towards countries that are aligned 
with the US. The alleged political manipulation of the IMF has led some scholars to 
recommend that it be given greater formal independence, similar to the independence 
nowadays granted to central banks (see, for instance, De Gregorio et al., 1999).
2 
In addition, political factors are likely to come into play from the demand side. To 
ensure that adjustment programs be implemented in countries receiving funds, the IMF must 
take factors that drive domestic political processes into account. For instance, reaching an 
agreement with the authorities that stands little chance of being approved by the legislature of 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, May 3, 2004, p.6. 
2 See Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and Berger et al. (2001) for reviews of the literature on central bank 
independence.   3
the country concerned seems futile (Willett, 2001).
3 Furthermore, ethnic, political, and other 
divisions may weaken government’s resolve to undertake reforms. Special interest groups that 
benefit from the continuation of distortionary policies that emerge during any process of 
economic reform may put pressure on the government (Mayer and Mourmouras, 2002).  
The empirical literature on the determinants of IMF credit suffers from some 
drawbacks. First, a wide variety of variables has been suggested as determinants of IMF 
involvement and there is little consensus in the literature which variables really matter. 
Second, most authors do not carefully examine the sensitivity of their findings. Thus it is hard 
to tell whether the variables reported to be significant in a particular regression are really 
robustly related to the likelihood that a country has an agreement with the Fund. Third, 
although some papers include political variables, most studies do not offer a systematic 
analysis of the role that political factors may play.
4 Authors, who take political factors into 
account, generally focus on a limited number of political variables only. 
  The aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent various economic and political 
variables that have been suggested in the literature as influencing IMF decisions are robust 
determinants of the chance that a country receives credit supplied by the IMF or signs an 
adjustment program with the Fund. In line with most of the literature, we focus on binary 
choice models of IMF activity. For this purpose, we estimate a panel model for 128 countries 
over the period 1972-1998 relating dummy variables indicating IMF involvement to economic 
and political data.  
  We use the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis to examine to what extent variables 
are robust determinants of the likelihood that a country will receive IMF credit or signs an 
adjustment program in a particular year. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to check 
for the robustness of a relationship has not been used in this line of literature, although is has 
been widely employed in the economic growth literature. As pointed out by Temple (2000), 
presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author(s) of a particular paper can be 
misleading. Extreme Bounds Analysis is a fairly neutral means to check robustness and 
compare the validity of conflicting findings in empirical research. 
Our results suggest that most of the political variables that have been put forward in 
previous studies on IMF involvement in a member country are non-significant. However, 
                                                 
3 Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) have developed a model in which the Fund’s financing and the conditionality 
attached to it change the incentives of the borrowing government and affect the political economy equilibrium in 
the recipient country. In this model government is subject to pressure by interest groups. Likewise, in Drazen’s 
(2001) model the government must contend with domestic veto players. The number and power of veto players 
depends on a country’s political and constitutional institutions. 
4 An exception is Rowlands (1995).   4
some political variables affect the likelihood that a member country signs an agreement with 
the IMF, while decisions on IMF credit disbursement are primarily based on economic 
considerations.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the variables 
that we take into account on the basis of previous studies. Section 3 explains the modelling 
strategy, while Section 4 contains the empirical results. The final section offers some 
concluding comments. 
 
2. Economic and political determinants of IMF involvement 
Appendix A1 summarizes studies that have been published since the beginning of the 1990s 
dealing with the determinants of IMF credit (for a review of the older literature, see Bird 
(1995) and Knight and Santaella (1997)).
5 These studies generally use a binary choice model 
(logit, probit) to distinguish between countries and time periods where an IMF program was 
in place and those where it was not, in order to determine which economic and political 
factors influenced IMF involvement.
6 As Knight and Santaella (1997) point out, the 
regressions can be interpreted as the reduced form derived from the “demand” for an IMF 
program by a recipient country and the IMF’s “supply”.
7 As we will point out below, previous 
studies have used a wide array of explanatory variables. Furthermore, the results for particular 
variables are often mixed. 
On the basis of previous studies we have selected a number of economic variables for 
further empirical analysis. Selecting those variables that have been included in at least two 
studies gave the following list: 
•  International reserve holdings scaled to imports (INTRESERV). Countries with relatively 
low levels of international reserves relative to imports will be less able to meet balance of 
payments difficulties through reserve use and hence will be more likely to request and 
receive IMF credit (Knight and Santaella, 1997). This variable has been included in 
almost all studies summarized in Table A1 and is generally reported to have a significant 
coefficient. 
                                                 
5 There is another line of literature that examines the impact of IMF adjustment programs; see Bird (2001) for a 
survey. 
6 Bird and Rowlands (2003b) have used non-parametric tests for 161 countries for the years 1965 to 2000. They 
find that countries that sign an IMF agreement have a significantly worse current account balance than other 
countries, although this pattern is time variant. Signing countries also had more problems with their reserves, 
especially if they had a more fixed exchange rate regime. High government budget deficits were also associated 
with an increasing likelihood of signing an agreement with the IMF. 
7 As far as we know, only four studies (Knight and Santaella, 1997, Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000 and 
Vreeland, 1999, 2001) have tried to disentangle both factors, but the separation of demand and supply factors in 
these studies remains a rather difficult task that has drawn severe criticism (see Dreher and Vaubel, 2000).   5
•  Real GDP growth (GGDP). Countries experiencing relatively weak growth in real GDP 
probably demand more credit. Various studies (including Barro and Lee, 2002 and Dreher 
and Vaubel, 2004) find this variable to be significant, but Bird and Rowlands (2001) find 
that it is not. As there is a possible endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a 
one-period lag in our models (GGDP1). 
•  Debt service scaled to exports (DEBTSERV). A heavy debt burden relative to exports 
increases countries’ need for external finance to service that debt. Many authors have 
included this variable in their models.
8 The results for this variable are mixed, however. 
While, for instance, Rowlands (1995) finds it to be significant, Joyce (1992) concludes 
that it does not affect the chance that a country is involved in an IMF program.  
•  Current account balance/GDP (CURACC). A country that has a balance of payments need 
for financial resources will be more likely to demand IMF credit. The results for this 
variable are surprisingly mixed: various authors conclude that the balance of payment did 
not affect the chances that a country has an IMF program (see, for instance, Knight and 
Santaella, 1997, and Vreeland, 2001). Given the possible endogeneity problem with this 
variable, it enters with a one-period lag in our models (CURACC1). 
•  External debt/GDP (DEBT). A high debt ratio may not only lead to more demand for IMF 
credit, but also to more supply as a high debt ratio may give a country bargaining leverage 
over the IMF because of its importance for global financial stability (Strom, 1999). On the 
other hand, a high debt ratio may reduce the creditworthiness of the country concerned. 
The results for this variable are, again, rather mixed. Whereas various studies (including 
Rowlands, 1995 and Thacker, 1999) find no effect of this variable, Bird and Rowlands 
(2001) find that it has a significant negative impact in their probit model. This variable is 
included with a one-period lag in our models as well (DEBT1). 
•  Income per capita (GDPCAP). Low-income countries may be more likely to seek Fund 
assistance.
9 Interestingly, various authors report a negative impact of income per capita in 
their probit models, Rowlands (1995) and Barro and Lee (2002) being the exceptions. The 
first study finds no effect, while the latter reports a positive impact, in combination with 
the square of GDP per capita, suggesting that the relationship is non-linear. In our model 
we use the lagged value of income per capita (GDPCAP1). 
                                                 
8 Sometimes GDP is used as scaling factor (see, for instance, Vreeland (1999, 2001) and Przeworski and 
Vreeland (2000). We prefer using exports as a scaling factor as interest in outstanding debt will have to be paid 
for by the receipts from exports.  
9 Knight and Santaella (1997) mention two reasons for this. First, poor countries have limited access to private 
international capital markets. Second, they may need technical assistance to develop well-functioning   6
•  Log of (1+inflation) (INFL). Countries experiencing high inflation are more likely in need 
of IMF credit. However, the willingness of the IMF to provide funds may be lower in case 
of high inflation. The results for this variable vary from negative (Dreher and Vaubel, 
2004), no effect (e.g. Joyce, 1992) to positive (Bird, 1995). Also this variable is included 
with a lag (INFL1). 
•  Lagged value of the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar 
(XRATE1). Countries faced with a speculative attack are more likely to turn to the IMF for 
assistance (Knight and Santaella, 1997).  
•  Lagged government budget deficit/GDP (DEFICIT1). Governments with high budget 
deficits are more likely to turn to the Fund (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000).
10 However, 
the Fund is more likely to enter into an arrangement with a country when its budget 
constraint is less binding. While some studies find no effect (e.g. Vreeland, 2001), others 
report a negative impact (e.g. Vreeland, 1999) of this variable.  
•  Lagged growth rate of the terms of trade (GTOT1). A worsening of a country’s terms of 
trade is likely to weaken a country’s external position, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that it will need to seek Fund assistance. Conway (1994) finds a negative impact of this 
variable, while Knight and Santaella (1997) find no effect. 
•  Lagged investment/GDP (INV1). A low ratio of investment to GDP may indicate limited 
access to international capital markets, thereby making it more likely that it requests Fund 
assistance. Knight and Santaella (1997), Vreeland (1999), Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) and Vreeland (2001) find support for this view. 
•  LIBOR. An increase in the world interest rate may cause countries to turn to the IMF for 
assistance. Some authors report support for this view (e.g. Dreher and Vaubel, 2004), 
while others do not (e.g. Rowlands, 1995). 
•  Lagged government expenditure/GDP (GOVSPEND1). Some studies have included a 
variable for government spending sometimes also found to be significant (see e.g. Joyce, 
1992). 
 
Turning to the IMF for financial assistance is a political decision. However, for an IMF 
program to be agreed on, not only does a government have to apply for funds, the IMF must 
also agree to the loan. From the demand as well as the supply side, the literature has suggested 
                                                                                                                                                         
institutions. Some critics of the IMF would perhaps interpret a significant effect of an income variable as support 
for the claim that the IMF has become to much of an aid agency (Rowlands, 1995). 
10 Bird and Rowlands (2003b) conclude that ignoring fiscal imbalances is unacceptable in an analysis of IMF 
program adoption.   7
various political factors that may influence the decision-making process on IMF loans. In 
selecting political variables to be used in our empirical model, we will systematically discuss 
political factors that have been recently suggested in the literature and identify proxies that 
can be applied to test the various hypotheses. Many of the variables can be interpreted both as 
determinants of government’s demand for IMF credit and as criteria by which the IMF may 
judge the creditworthiness of countries demanding credit.  
It is well-known from the literature that there is a high degree of persistence in IMF 
involvement (Hutchison and Noy, 2003). To capture this, we follow Przeworky and Vreeland 
(2000) using the lag of a 5-years moving average of a dummy indicating whether or not a 
country was under an agreement (YRSUNDER51).  
Not all countries that would be eligible to draw resources from the IMF would decide to 
do so to the extent that they perceive some loss of discretion over their choice of adjustment 
policy. Especially, as argued by Bird and Rowlands (2000), governments that perceive a large 
gap between their preferred policies and those expected in the context of IMF conditionality 
are the least likely to turn to the Fund. However, the more countries turn to the Fund, the less 
costly the ‘sovereignty costs’ may be perceived to be. Following Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) we therefore include a variable reflecting the number of other countries in which the 
Fund is involved (NRUNDER). 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) suggest that governments are more likely to enter an 
agreement early in the election term, hoping that any perceived stigma of signing an 
agreement will be forgiven or forgotten before the next elections. In other words, demand for 
IMF credit might be higher after election years. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) report 
evidence in support of this view. While various safeguards against the misuse of IMF 
resources are routinely incorporated into IMF lending programs, Dreher and Vaubel (2004) 
suggest that the availability of IMF credit might indirectly help to finance electoral 
campaigns. They find that net credit supplied by the IMF is generally higher around election 
time.
11 To test for the effect of elections, we include two election dummy variables: one for 
election years for the executive (ELECEX) and one for election years for the legislative 
(ELEXLEG). As previous studies argue that there should be an effect before and/or after the 
election, we take the lag and the lead of the election dummies. 
The possibility of blaming the IMF for the necessary adjustment policies may be an 
incentive to resort to the Fund. By involving the Fund in the decision-making process, 
national politicians may be able to shield themselves from the political fall-out of unpopular   8
policies (Vaubel, 1986). Countries with more unstable and polarized political systems will 
have more difficulties to arrange a credible adjustment program and will, therefore, have a 
higher incentive to turn to the Fund. In this way, they will obtain a seal of approval for a 
political program and, thus, gain in credibility. We have applied a number of proxies to 
capture this argument: the number of political assassinations (ASSAS), and revolutions 
(REVOL), and guerilla problems (GUERIL), the (lagged) number of government crises 
(CRISIS)
12, and instability within the government (GOVCHANGE). On the other hand, the 
IMF might be less willing to provide its seal of approval when there is less than full political 
support of such a program. The issue whether international organizations such as the IMF 
should or should not seek broad local support for the policies they endorse or incorporate in 
lending conditions is at the heart of the debate on ‘country ownership’ (see, for instance, 
Helleiner, 2001). In the end, the existence and direction of the relationship between the above 
listed variables with the disbursement of IMF resources is, therefore, an empirical question. 
In general, the decision to involve the IMF crucially depends on government’s 
assessment of the political costs that may result from the adjustment policies. A high level of 
social unrest (proxied by three variables: the number of demonstrations (DEMON), strikes 
(STRIKES) and riots (RIOTS)) prior to the disbursement of IMF funds to a country might 
indicate a pronounced need for outside resources—no matter what strings are attached—to 
help calm an ongoing economic and political crisis.
13  
Another implication of this line of reasoning is that autocratic regimes—proxied by an 
executive index of competitiveness (EXCOMP)—will have a smaller incentive to request IMF 
assistance as they can more easily withstand unpopular adjustment programs (Bird and 
Rowlands, 2001, Edwards and Santaella, 1993). On the other hand, Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) argue that as dictatorships are less constrained by public opinion and competitive 
elections, they may make easier negotiation partners for the IMF, and are therefore more 
likely to get credit. Which, if any, argument prevails is again an empirical question. 
Political interests of its principal shareholders may be seen to influence decisions by the 
IMF. An 85 percent majority is required for the most important Fund decisions. Since voting 
power is—broadly speaking—allocated on the basis of economic size, the US (which controls 
17.83 percent of the voting power in the IMF), as well as small coalitions of industrialized 
                                                                                                                                                         
11 Dreher (2004) reports that governments that conclude an IMF arrangement within 12 months prior to an 
election generally increase their re-election probability. 
12 As government crises may also occur due to an IMF stabilization program, we take the lagged value of crises 
to circumvent endogeneity.   9
countries hold veto power in the Fund’s decision making (Thacker, 1999).
14 Another 
argument as to how the interests of large industrial countries may influence IMF credit supply 
has been put forward by Oatley and Yackee (2000) and Oatley (2002). These papers find 
evidence suggesting that IMF lending decisions are responsive to these interests as larger 
loans went to countries in which commercial banks from industrial countries were highly 
exposed. Still, Oatley (2002) concludes that not all commercial banks benefit to the same 
degree. Commercial banks based in Japan do not seem to benefit at all, while banks based in 
France benefit less than banks based in Germany, the UK, the US, and Switzerland. We 
include in our model the variable USBANKS that shows the exposure of US banks to the 
various countries under consideration. We also include a variable reflecting the importance of 
the US as a trading partner: imports and exports from/to US as share of total trade of a 
particular country (TRADEUS). It may also be true that the main stakeholders in the IMF have 
stronger preferences for countries in a certain region. For instance, the US may be more 
concerned with countries in Asia than in Africa, say. We therefore include regional dummy 
variables in our model. 
Bird and Rowlands (2000) also suggest that the IMF could prefer lending in general to 
countries that are more liberal—proxied by LIBERAL, i.e. the total of the political rights index  
and the civil liberties index of the Freedom House—and those with good governance—
proxied by corruption indicator (CORRUPT), a rule of law indicator (RULELAW), an 
indicator for the risk of repudiation of government contracts (REPUDIATION), and an 
indicator for the quality of the bureaucracy (BURQUAL). All these indicators are provided by 
ICRG. 
The size of a country requesting support may also matter: larger countries—proxied by 
(lagged) relative size (RELSIZE)—may more easily get support to the extent that the 
‘systemic’ or ‘contagion’ risk of a balance of payments problem in these countries is higher 
than in smaller countries. 
Of course, the influence of a country in the IMF may also affect the chance that it will 
receive a loan. For given economic conditions, an IMF loan is more likely the higher the 
quota of a country. Following Barro and Lee (2002), we therefore include share of IMF 
quotas (IMFQUOTA) as explanatory variable. 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 All these variables enter with a one-period lag. This also helps to avoid the possible endogeneity problem. 
Demonstrations, strikes, and riots may contemporaneously increase if the government has to take unpopular 
measures as part of an IMF stabilization program. 
14 There is evidence suggesting that the degree to which countries vote in line with the US in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UN) might affect the chance that a country will receive IMF credit (Thacker,   10
Finally, some other variables reflecting supply considerations may be found in the 
recent literature on the determinants of success and failure of IMF or World Bank-supported 
programs. Dollar and Svensson (2000) conclude in their study of Bank-supported adjustment 
programs that success can be predicted by a small number of domestic political economy 
variables, including ethnic divisions, government instability, and undemocratic governments. 
Likewise, Ivanova et al. (2003) conclude in their study of success and failure of IMF-
supported programs that the strength of special interests in parliament, political cohesion and 
ethnic diversity affect the probability of successful program implementation. Therefore, we 
have included the following variables: 
•  Ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC). Ethnic fractionalization leads to conflict in society, 
which is a threat to reform efforts. 
•  Special interests (INTERESTS): the maximum share of seats in parliament held by 
parties representing special interests (religious, nationalistic, regional and rural 
groups). This variable is also used by Ivanova et al. (2003).  
•  Political cohesion (IPCOH). Lower political cohesion introduces more uncertainty 
regarding the implementation of reforms. 
Appendix A2 describes all variables employed in the present paper in more detail and gives 
the sources, while appendix A3 shows the correlation matrix. As Table A3 shows, the 
correlation between the variables is generally quite low, except for the inflation rate and the 
exchange rate. 
 
3. Modeling approach 
We employ (variants) of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by 
Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to examine which explanatory variables are 
robustly related to our dependent variable. To the best of our knowledge, this has never been 
done before in the literature on the determinants of IMF credit, although there are some very 
good reasons to apply this methodology.  
  The EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature (see Sturm and De 
Haan, 2004 for a further discussion). The central difficulty in this research—which also 
applies to the research topic of the present paper—is that several different models may all 
seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about the parameters of 
interest. Indeed, a glance at the studies summarized in Appendix A1 illustrates this point. The 
                                                                                                                                                         
1999 and Barro and Lee, 2002). Unfortunately, we could not test this hypothesis as we did not have access to the 
proper data.   11
results of these studies sometimes differ substantially, while most authors do not offer a 
careful analysis to examine how sensitive their conclusions are with respect to model 
specification. As pointed out by Temple (2000), presenting only the results of the model 
preferred by the author can be misleading.  
  The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form are 
estimated: 
 
 Y=  αM + βF + γZ + u       (1) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is the 
variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt, 1992) 
possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to the 
dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if 
the lower extreme bound for β—i.e. the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations—is 
negative, while the upper extreme bound for β—i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard 
deviations—is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to Y. 
  As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with 
certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these 
circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to 
alternative modeling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly 
this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) argues that the 
test applied in the extreme bounds analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the 
distribution of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least 
one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. 
We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions 
in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient 
of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997a,b) suggestion to analyze the entire 
distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter estimate 
of  β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative distribution function 
(CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero.
15 
We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA.  
                                                 
15 Sala-i-Martin (1997a) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, 
the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses   12
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and in the Z 
vector is likely to be rather arbitrary. Still, as pointed out by Temple (2000), there is no reason 
why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a general specification) 
cannot be used in advance to identify variables that seem to be particularly relevant—an 
approach that we have followed as well. We use the 13 economic variables as discussed in 
section 2 (see Appendix A2) and a general-to-specific selection procedure to come up with 
our basic model. We first examine how robust this basic model is. Next, we check whether the 
other economic and political variables discussed in section 2 are robustly related to the chance 
that a country receives IMF credit or signs an IMF agreement. 
 
4. Results 
Explaining the Use of IMF Credit 
The first dependent variable considered is based on the “use of IMF credit” as reported in the 
World Bank Development Indicators 2003.
16 We have created a dummy variable that is one 
when the use of IMF credit is positive. So, this variable measures whether or not a country 
receives IMF credit in a specific year. 
Our data set includes annual data for 128 IMF member countries over the period 1972 
to 1998. We have employed a panel model and estimate binary choice probit models by 
maximum likelihood. We use White (1980) errors to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.  
In line with the view that decision-making within the IMF should be primarily based 
on economic considerations, we start by identifying a basic model using standard model 
selection procedures (general to specific) using the 13 economic variables as discussed in 
section 2. An extensive analysis of the data based on a general to specific approach yielded 
the two variables that we selected for our M vector: international reserve holdings scaled to 
imports (INTRESERV) and lagged real GDP growth (GGDP1). These variables (or variables 
akin to these) are also present in most models of IMF lending behavior in the literature 
(compare Table A1 in the appendix). A decrease in available international reserves signals 
pressure on the value of a national currency on the forex markets. Arguably, extending credit 
to member countries that experience exchange rate problems is part of the traditional IMF 
mission. A possible explanation of the negative correlation between IMF credit disbursement 
                                                                                                                                                         
a problem. Sturm and De Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good 
indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not 
equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather 
different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version.    13
and real growth is that countries suffering a severe real shock are more likely to turn to the 
IMF for help. However, real shocks might also lead to financial and exchange rate crises 
(Allen and Gale, 2000), triggering IMF support for member countries.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis of the basic model. 
The first two columns show the extreme lower and upper bounds, while column (7) shows the 
specification of the models yielding the upper and lower extreme bounds. Column (3) reports 
the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable of interest differs 
significantly from zero. Column (4) shows the CDF(0). Columns (5) and (6) present the 
unweighted parameter estimate of the variable of interest and its standard deviation, 
respectively.  
It follows from Table 1 (panel A) that the explanatory variables have an unweighted 
CDF(0) of close to 1—satisfying the criterion suggested by Sala-i-Martin—and are significant 
in almost all regressions underlying this CDF(0). However, according to the very stringent 
EBA the variables do not qualify as being robustly related to our dependent variable, since the 
upper and lower bound change sign—which illustrates the advantages of applying the Sala-i-
Martin approach rather than the original EBA approach proposed by Leamer (1983). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for all other economic and 
political variables discussed in section 2. As Appendix A3 shows, the correlation between the 
variables in the Z-vector is not unacceptably high, except for inflation and the growth rate of 
the nominal exchange rate. Panel C of Table 1 therefore shows the results for these variables 
if either inflation or the exchange rate is dropped.  
In view of the long list of factors that have been claimed to influence IMF credit in 
previous studies it is quite remarkable that only a limited number of variables are actually 
robustly related to our dependent variable. To be more precise, apart from the variables in the 
base model (i.e. INTRESERV and GGDP1) only DEBTSERV,  CURACC1,  GDPCAP1, 
INVEST1, YRSUNDER51 and REPUDIATION have a CDF(0) > 0.95. The economic variables 
reflecting real activity, debt service and the current account position were also found to be 
significant in many other studies. Interestingly, IMF decision-making on credit disbursement 
is hardly, if at all, influenced by political factors. Moreover, the two political variables that 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 The World bank data set is similar in most respects to the IFS data set but offers a greater variety of variables 
with a political economic interpretation.. Alternative specifications of the dependent variable are used later on in 
this section.   14
seem to play a role here, YRSUNDER51 and REPUDIATION, might well be interpreted as 
reflecting persistence of IMF involvement and default risk, respectively, and not so much 
purely political economic factors. 
Our conclusions are not influenced by the inclusion of either the exchange rate or 
inflation in the Z-vector. As follows from Panel C of Table 1, the CDF(0) of inflation and the 
exchange rate does not exceed 0.95. 
 
Explaining the Signing of IMF Agreements 
As pointed out in section 2, a large number of previous studies focuses on the likelihood that a 
country in a particular year has an adjustment program with the Fund. It should be 
interesting to see whether the results on IMF credit disbursement extend to an analysis of the 
determinants of the adoption of IMF agreements. To that end we apply the approach 
developed above to a new dummy variable indicating whether an IMF agreement was signed 
in a particular year.
17 While we would expect the determinants of actual credit disbursement 
and the signing of IMF agreements to be similar, these two variables still describe two fairly 
distinct decisions: the signing of an agreement between the IMF and a member country and 
the disbursement of IMF credit to a particular member country. These decisions are likely to 
be influenced by different considerations. Furthermore, an agreement will often lead to more 
than one year of credit flows. Credit flows can be changed or interrupted if certain conditions 
specified in the adjustment program are not fulfilled. Finally, countries can borrow from the 
IMF up to their quota without an agreement. 
Table 2 shows the results. We have employed the same basic model as in our previous 
analysis, i.e. INTRESERV and (lagged) GGDP are the explanatory variables. As shown in 
panel A of Table 2, the variables in the basic model have a CDF(0) larger than 0.95. Still, the 
CDF(0)s and the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficients of INTRESERV and 
(lagged) GGDP are significant are somewhat lower than in Table 1.  
Interestingly, it follows from panel B of Table 2, that there are more variables, 
including some political variables, with a CDF(0) > 0.95. While some of the economic 
variables that we found to be robust before (DEBTSERV, INVEST1) still are, others are not. 
The (lagged) current account (CURACC1) and GDPCAP1 are not as robustly related to the 
LHS-variable as before. Our results suggest that—other than in the previous model—various 
                                                 
17 The Fund has different facilities, like Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Enhanced Fund Facility (EFF), the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Whenever there 
is an agreement signed in a particular year so that a country can borrow from any of these four facilities the 
dummy is one, and is zero otherwise. We thank Dane Rowlands for providing data that have been used to 
construct this dummy variable.   15
political variables also affect the likelihood of IMF involvement in a member country. To be 
more precise, in addition to YRSUNDER51, the CDF(0) of GOVCHANGE, ELECLEGLAG,  
ELEXEXLAG and ETHNIC exceed 0.95, while REPUDIATION no longer plays a significant 
role. Based on the estimated average coefficients, our results suggest that elections increase 
the likelihood that an agreement with the IMF will be signed. A plausible interpretation – and 
in line with our results with respect to GOVCHANGE
18 – is that new governments are more 
likely to agree to the conditionality encompassed in IMF lending agreements. This result 
lends some support to the findings of Dreher and Vaubel (2004) and Dreher (2004). 
Somewhat surprisingly, Table 2 also reports a positive coefficient for ETHNIC—a result  that 
is not particularly robust, however (see below). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Overall, it would seem that political economic considerations—in particular changes 
in government—play quite an important role when it comes to signing an agreement between 
the IMF and a member country, while decisions on credit disbursement seem to be primarily 
based on economic considerations.  
 
Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our conclusions, we conducted further sensitivity analyses. First, we 
split the overall sample along the time dimension. Arguably, the world has changed 
considerably since the end of the 1980s and this may also have affected IMF policies. Broadly 
speaking, our general conclusions are similar in the pre-1989 and the post-1989 subsamples. 
Still, in the model of the likelihood that a country receives an IMF loan some variables do not 
have the same impact in the two sample periods. For instance, the CDF(0) of GDPCAP1 
drops to 0.90 in the period before 1989, suggesting that income levels have become more 
important in IMF credit policies post 1989. The CDF(0) of XRATE(1) in the period before 
1989 is 0.99 while the CDF(0) of DEBT1 is 0.96 suggesting that exchange rate and debt crises 
may have been more important in the earlier days in receiving IMF loans than in more recent 
periods. Overall, however, the findings on credit disbursement are remarkably stable across 
the split sample. The results for the model of the likelihood that an agreement with the IMF is 
signed change even less. The only major difference is that in the period after 1989 the CDF(0) 
                                                 
18 The CDF(0) of GOVCHANGE is 0.95, suggesting that—given the positive sign of the average coefficient 
estimate —countries with many government changes are more likely to sign an agreement with the IMF. 
Specific results available on request.   16
of the variable CRISES1 becomes 0.98; the coefficient of the variable is negative, in line with 
the theoretical prediction. 
Second, we have dropped large credits from the analysis.
19 The decision-making 
process about huge loans to countries like Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and Korea may have 
been very different from that of loans that are of ‘going-concern’ nature. However, it turned 
out that the results reported in Table 1 hardly change. In two cases the CDF(0) drops slightly 
to below 0.95 (DEBTSERV (0.94), CURACC1 (0.94)), while in two other cases the CDF(0) is 
now above 0.95 (GTOT1 (0.96) and USBANKS (0.96)). If we drop the same observations and 
redo the regressions yielding Table 2, we even find less changes (the CDF(0) of ETHNIC 
drops to 0.93), while the CDF(0) of  ELEXEXLEAD rises to 0.95)). 
 
 
5. Concluding comments 
The activities of the IMF continue to draw attention both in the public sphere and among 
economists and political scientists. In recent years, the discussion has increasingly focused on 
political economic factors possibly influencing IMF lending. However, despite an abundance 
of empirical research investigating the interaction of various political factors and IMF 
behavior, there is hardly a consensus which of these forces might matter, casting doubt on the 
general robustness of these results. To some extent this is also true for the question of which 
economic variables are robustly linked to IMF activity. The present paper provides a thorough 
robustness analysis of both economic and political determinants of IMF activity. 
A first result is that IMF agreements are more likely to be concluded and IMF credit is 
more likely to be disbursed when real economic activity is depressed and current account 
problems arise. This finding supports the idea that the IMF is (still) pursuing its traditional 
goal of fostering economic and balance-of-payment stability among its members. 
Secondly, we find that political economic factors influence IMF activity, but only to a 
minor degree. In fact, many of the political variables reported in the empirical literature to 
influence the Fund’s behavior are not significantly related to either IMF lending or the 
conclusion of IMF agreements.  
Thirdly, to the extent that political variables matter, there is a remarkable difference 
between factors helping to explain the conclusion of IMF agreements and the disbursement of 
IMF credit. It would seem that political factors—especially elections—play a significant role 
                                                 
19 All observations with an increase in outstanding IMF credit > 2.5 per cent of GDP (which in the base line 
model implies roughly 2.5 per cent of all observations) were dropped from the sample. Specific results available 
on request.   17
in the conclusion of IMF agreements. Elections increase the probability of an IMF agreement 
being concluded. However, the likelihood that a country actually receives IMF credit is 
primarily driven by economic considerations. According to our analysis, the only not strictly 
economic variables that have some importance in explaining IMF credit disbursement are the 
presence of IMF programs in the past five years, indicating persistence of IMF involvement, 
and the risk of repudiation. The higher the risk of repudiation, the less likely it is that a 
country receives IMF credit. 
Finally, an interesting question is, why political factors seem to matter more for the 
conclusion of IMF agreements than for the actual disbursement of IMF credit. A possible 
explanation is the greater post-election willingness of governments to embrace IMF 
conditionality: from a demand side perspective new governments are more likely to invest 
their political capital into an IMF-supported adjustment program than governments later in 
their term because they are more likely enjoy the fruits of their efforts. For the same reason 
the Fund might deem new governments more credible “owners” of the adjustment packages 
attached to the typical IMF agreement. Once signed, credit disbursement is conditional 
primarily on economic conditions.    18
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a) The results for the bivariate probit model are shown. 
b) The results for the determinants of entering an IMF program are shown. 
 
 Appendix A2. List of variables and their sources 
Variable: Sign:  Description:  Source: 
INTRESERV  (-)  International reserves (current US$) / imports of 
goods and services (current US$) 
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
GGDP  (-)  Growth of real GDP   World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
DEBTSERV  (+)  Total debt service (% of exports of goods and 
services)  
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
CURACC  (-)  Current account balance (% of GDP)   World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
DEBT  (?)  External debt, total (DOD, current US$) / GDP at 
market prices (current US$) 
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
GDPCAP  (-)  Log (GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$) / 
population) 
World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
INFL  (?)  Log (1+inflation (consumer prices))  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
XRATE  (+)  Growth rate of nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis $   World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
DEFICIT  (?)  Overall budget deficit, including grants (% of GDP) World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
GTOT  (-)  Growth rate of terms of trade  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
INVEST  (-)  Gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP)   World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
LIBOR  (+)  LIBOR: 3 month rate  IFS June 2002 
GOVSPEND  (+)  Total government expenditure (% GDP)  World Bank Development 
Indicators 2003 CD-Rom 
YRSUNDER5  (+)  5-years-Moving Average of dummy indicating that 
a country was under an agreement 
Rowland data set 
NRUNDER  (+)  sum of the countries under an agreement  Rowland data set 
ELECEX  (+)  Dummy for executive election-years  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
ELECLEG  (+)  Dummy for legislative election-years  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
ELECEXLAG  (+) Lag  of  ELECEX  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
ELECLEGLAG  (+) Lag  of  ELECLEG  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
ELECEXLEAD  (+) Lead  of  ELECEX  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
ELECLEGLEAD  (+) Lead  of  ELECLEG  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2   26
Variable: Sign:  Description:  Source: 
ASSAS  (+)  Number of politically motivated murders or 
attempted murders of high government officials or 
politicians 
Banks' International Archive 
REVOL  (+)  Number of revolutions (illegal or forced changes in 
the top governmental elite, attempts at such 
changes, or (un)successful armed rebellions) 
Banks' International Archive 
GUERIL  (+)  Guerilla warfare: any armed activity, sabotage, or 
bombings aimed at the overthrow of the present 
regime 
Banks' International Archive 
CRISES  (+)  Number of major government crises that threaten to 
bring the downfall of the present regime 
World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
GOVCHANGE  (+)  Percentage of veto players who drop from the 
government 
Banks' International Archive  
DEMON  (+)  Number of peaceful anti-government 
demonstrations 
Banks' International Archive 
STRIKES  (+)  Number of strikes (1,000 or more workers) aimed 
at national government policies or authority 
Banks' International Archive 
RIOTS  (+)  Number of violent demonstrations or clashes of 
more than 100 citizens 
Banks' International Archive 
ECXOMP  (?)  Measure of dictatorship (executive index of 
electoral competitiveness <= 2) 
World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
USBANKS  (+)  Exposure of US banks  Treasury Bulletin 
TRADEUS  (+)  Trade relations with US (export to and import from 
US / total export and import) 
OECD ICTS database, World 
Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
ASIAE, OECD, 
SAFRICA 
(?) Regional  dummies  …. 
LIBERAL  (+)  (Political rights index + Civil liberties index)/2  Freedom House 
CORRUPT  (-)  Indicator for corruption in government  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data 
RULELAW  (+)  Rule of law (law and order tradition) indicator  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data 
REPUDIATION  (-)  Indicator for repudiation risk of government 
contracts 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data 
BURQUAL  (+)  Indicator for bureaucratic quality  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data 
RELSIZE  (+)  Relative size of country (GDP / World GDP)  World Bank 2000 CD-Rom 
IMFQUOTA  (+)  Share of IMF quota  IMF 
ETHNIC  (-)  Presence of ethnic tensions  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Data 
INTERESTS  (-)  = (special interest groups in government + 
opposition)/(# government + opposition seats) 
World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
IPCOH  (-)  Index of Political cohesion  World Bank database of 
political institutions, version 2 
 
Note: The expected sign is shown in parentheses. See main text for further explanation. 
A 1 following the variable indicates the first lag of the variable concerned.Appendix A3. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 
Note: The upper-right part of this matrix shows the correlation coefficients, whereas the lower-left part shows the number of observations used to calculate this. The diagonal shows 
the number of observations available for each series
Obs\Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
(1) INTRESV 2644 0.09 -0.01 0.20 -0.13 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 0.17 0.31 0.29 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.22 -0.14 0.03
(2) GGDP 2598 3425 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.24 -0.15 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 -0.13 -0.1 3 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 40 . 0 00 . 0 40 . 0 30 . 1 10 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 10 . 1 10 . 1 80 . 2 70 . 1 70 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 1 2 - 0 . 0 80 . 0 3
(3) DEBTSERV 2607 3132 3222 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.10 -0.10 0.18 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 0.03 0.25 0.21 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(4) CURACC 2178 2642 2560 2703 -0.32 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.12 -0.32 -0.04 -0.18 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.09 0. 0 60 . 0 90 . 0 00 . 1 30 . 0 60 . 1 00 . 0 5 - 0 . 1 8 - 0 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 1 50 . 1 40 . 2 20 . 1 70 . 2 10 . 0 50 . 0 20 . 0 3
(5) DEBT 2586 3285 3181 2651 3364 -0.28 0.26 0.24 -0.21 -0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.10 -0.07 -0.17 -0.25 -0.21 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 0.17 -0.07
(6) GFPCAP 2612 3365 3132 2649 3284 3406 -0.01 -0.03 0.19 0.02 0.27 -0.01 0.10 -0.14 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.10 -0.15 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.08 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 2 70 . 3 10 . 3 50 . 1 60 . 0 9 - 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 4 70 . 2 70 . 3 50 . 4 60 . 4 20 . 1 50 . 1 30 . 4 2 - 0 . 1 40 . 1 0
(7) INFL 2312 2725 2604 2321 2691 2709 2852 0.91 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 0.19 -0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.18 -0.06 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.01
(8) XRATE 2533 3144 2980 2619 3119 3123 2755 3495 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.16 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.01 -0.06 0.19 0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(9) DEFICIT 1753 2017 1942 1745 1986 1994 1833 2023 2065 0.10 -0.02 -0.13 -0.54 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 0.10 0.32 0.27 0.19 0.03 0.02 0.23 -0.21 0.03
(10) GTOT 2242 2677 2634 2223 2640 2677 2281 2579 1699 2677 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.00
(11) INVEST 2569 3158 3081 2571 3096 3132 2634 3010 1996 2634 3238 0.04 0.25 -0.20 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.06 0.20 -0.02 -0.28 -0.09 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.16 -0.05 0.04
(12) LIBOR 2644 3425 3222 2703 3364 3406 2852 3495 2065 2677 3238 4120 0.03 -0.15 -0.29 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.17 -0.29 -0.32 -0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.11
(13) GOVSPEND 1757 2023 1946 1751 1993 2001 1841 2032 2050 1704 2001 2072 2072 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.16 -0.21 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.06 -0.18 -0.17 0.05 0.22 -0.02
(14) YRSUNDER5 2369 3036 2867 2635 2982 3028 2577 3157 1923 2449 2886 3420 1934 3420 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.06 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.01
(15) NRUNDER 2644 3284 3099 2585 3225 3267 2737 3361 2005 2561 3110 3974 2012 3281 3974 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.21 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.13 0.37 0.44 0.17 -0.05 0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.20
(16) ELECEX 1964 2302 2198 2022 2259 2291 1971 2418 1567 1883 2222 2567 1576 2567 2567 2567 0.32 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.02
(17) ELECLEG 1964 2302 2198 2022 2259 2291 1971 2418 1567 1883 2222 2567 1576 2567 2567 2567 2567 -0.05 -0.14 0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01
(18) ELECEXLAG 1984 2345 2239 2109 2301 2333 2014 2438 1578 1932 2262 2582 1585 2582 2582 2453 2453 2582 0.32 -0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.20 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.00
(19) ELECLEGLAG 1984 2345 2239 2109 2301 2333 2014 2438 1578 1932 2262 2582 1585 2582 2582 2453 2453 2582 2582 -0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.15 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.07
(20) ELECEXLEAD 1938 2256 2154 1921 2213 2245 1924 2401 1555 1834 2179 2550 1564 2448 2550 2438 2438 2325 2325 2550 0.32 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.03
(21) ELECLEGLEAD 1938 2256 2154 1921 2213 2245 1924 2401 1555 1834 2179 2550 1564 2448 2550 2438 2438 2325 2325 2550 2550 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.06 0.040 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 80 . 0 50 . 0 30 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 80 . 0 20 . 0 30 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 30 . 0 60 . 0 00 . 0 1
(22) ASSAS 2016 2338 2238 1839 2301 2326 1973 2466 1537 1807 2274 2767 1544 2347 2767 2193 2193 2082 2082 2298 2298 2767 0.20 0.30 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.20 -0.04 0.10 0.15 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.01 -0.05 0.07
(23) REVOL 2016 2338 2238 1839 2301 2326 1973 2466 1537 1807 2274 2767 1544 2347 2767 2193 2193 2082 2082 2298 2298 2767 2767 0.42 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.15 -0.26 -0.20 -0.23 -0.02 0.00 -0.25 0.04 0.01
(24) GUERIL 2016 2338 2238 1839 2301 2326 1973 2466 1537 1807 2274 2767 1544 2347 2767 2193 2193 2082 2082 2298 2298 2767 2767 2767 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.08 -0.28 -0.14 -0.09 0.12 0.16 -0.30 -0.01 0.04
(25) CRISES 2114 2461 2354 1956 2423 2448 2082 2570 1607 1912 2389 2883 1613 2466 2883 2315 2315 2208 2208 2405 2405 2741 2741 2741 2883 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.12 -0.11 0.04 0.15
(26) GOVCHANGE 1868 2188 2089 1975 2146 2177 1876 2286 1484 1790 2108 2421 1492 2421 2421 2411 2411 2411 2411 2289 2289 2058 2058 2058 2174 2421 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.14
(27) DEMON 2113 2461 2354 1956 2423 2448 2081 2570 1607 1913 2389 2883 1613 2466 2883 2315 2315 2208 2208 2405 2405 2741 2741 2741 2881 2174 2883 0.31 0.68 -0.07 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.13 0.29 0.33 -0.04 0.05 0.05
(28) STRIKES 2114 2461 2354 1956 2423 2448 2082 2570 1607 1912 2389 2883 1613 2466 2883 2315 2315 2208 2208 2405 2405 2741 2741 2741 2883 2174 2881 2883 0.33 -0.06 0.09 0.14 -0.08 -0.04 -0.18 -0.16 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.10
(29) RIOTS 2114 2461 2354 1956 2423 2448 2082 2570 1607 1912 2389 2883 1613 2466 2883 2315 2315 2208 2208 2405 2405 2741 2741 2741 2883 2174 2881 2883 2883 -0.05 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.20 0.31 0.37 -0.16 0.09 0.05
(30) ECXOMP 1972 2312 2210 2032 2269 2301 1982 2427 1570 1893 2231 2575 1579 2575 2575 2563 2563 2457 2457 2434 2434 2189 2189 2189 2312 2421 2312 2312 2312 2575 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.14 0.43 -0.17 -0.17 -0.26 -0.19 -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14
(31) USBANKS 1084 1278 1222 1181 1252 1274 1090 1276 837 1050 1237 1364 837 1364 1364 1307 1307 1303 1303 1305 1305 1252 1252 1252 1353 1284 1354 1353 1353 1305 1364 0.32 0.17 0.01 -0.25 -0.20 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.60 0.50 0.24 -0.09 0.06
(32) TRADEUS 1871 2413 2316 2214 2388 2406 2077 2432 1498 2006 2341 2593 1503 2577 2462 1909 1909 2026 2026 1790 1790 1664 1664 1664 1788 1881 1788 1788 1788 1919 1298 2593 0.01 -0.07 -0.40 -0.39 -0.12 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.13 0.19 -0.20 -0.09
(33) ASIAE 1924 2199 2153 1770 2177 2187 2039 2202 1522 1936 2174 2324 1523 2025 2249 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1766 1766 1766 1838 1591 1838 1838 1838 1694 913 1589 2324 -0.03 -0.23 -0.09 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.15 0.13 -0.04 -0.14 0.12
(34) OECD 1924 2199 2153 1770 2177 2187 2039 2202 1522 1936 2174 2324 1523 2025 2249 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1766 1766 1766 1838 1591 1838 1838 1838 1694 913 1589 2324 2324 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.04 -0.11 -0.07 0.13
(35) SAFRICA 1924 2199 2153 1770 2177 2187 2039 2202 1522 1936 2174 2324 1523 2025 2249 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1690 1766 1766 1766 1838 1591 1838 1838 1838 1694 913 1589 2324 2324 2324 0.39 -0.06 -0.13 -0.24 0.01 -0.29 -0.30 -0.33 0.29 -0.29
(36) LIBERAL 2455 2945 2808 2510 2900 2928 2535 3108 1928 2442 2856 3289 1938 3088 3289 2516 2516 2535 2535 2485 2485 2469 2469 2469 2598 2376 2599 2598 2598 2525 1330 2399 2042 2042 2042 3289 -0.21 -0.24 -0.30 -0.26 -0.05 -0.09 -0.32 0.31 -0.26
(37) CORRUPT 1066 1249 1180 1150 1204 1233 1118 1241 870 1105 1223 1307 871 1302 1307 1266 1266 1270 1270 1181 1181 1041 1041 1041 1127 1259 1128 1127 1127 1274 1004 1267 1016 1016 1016 1286 1307 0.55 0.38 0.56 0.14 0.12 0.32 -0.01 0.08
(38) RULELAW 1066 1249 1180 1150 1204 1233 1118 1241 870 1105 1223 1307 871 1302 1307 1266 1266 1270 1270 1181 1181 1041 1041 1041 1127 1259 1128 1127 1127 1274 1004 1267 1016 1016 1016 1286 1307 1307 0.61 0.52 0.14 0.13 0.48 -0.09 0.21
(39) REPUDIATION 1066 1249 1180 1150 1204 1233 1118 1241 870 1105 1223 1307 871 1302 1307 1266 1266 1270 1270 1181 1181 1041 1041 1041 1127 1259 1128 1127 1127 1274 1004 1267 1016 1016 1016 1286 1307 1307 1307 0.54 0.20 0.18 0.44 -0.06 0.22
(40) BURQUAL 1066 1249 1180 1150 1204 1233 1118 1241 870 1105 1223 1307 871 1302 1307 1266 1266 1270 1270 1181 1181 1041 1041 1041 1127 1259 1128 1127 1127 1274 1004 1267 1016 1016 1016 1286 1307 1307 1307 1307 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.06 0.14
(41) RELSIZE 2629 3342 3195 2703 3364 3348 2725 3182 2014 2677 3165 3448 2021 3045 3308 2299 2299 2337 2337 2255 2255 2363 2363 2363 2485 2181 2485 2485 2485 2309 1269 2411 2203 2203 2203 2960 1223 1223 1223 1223 3448 0.79 0.08 -0.05 0.05
(42) IMFQUOTA 2625 3367 3159 2682 3302 3346 2837 3495 2047 2625 3185 3872 2054 3366 3734 2544 2544 2559 2559 2527 2527 2695 2695 2695 2808 2400 2808 2808 2808 2552 1342 2542 2324 2324 2324 3254 1279 1279 1279 1279 3386 3872 0.04 0.02 0.04
(43) ETHNIC 1066 1249 1180 1150 1204 1233 1118 1241 870 1105 1223 1307 871 1302 1307 1266 1266 1270 1270 1181 1181 1041 1041 1041 1127 1259 1128 1127 1127 1274 1004 1267 1016 1016 1016 1286 1307 1307 1307 1307 1223 1279 1307 -0.15 0.12
(44) INTERESTS 1006 1101 1068 1036 1081 1104 1034 1082 805 965 1081 1112 809 1112 1112 1102 1102 1081 1081 1007 1007 838 838 838 921 1090 921 921 921 1112 619 929 838 838 838 1086 688 688 688 688 1103 1108 688 1112 -0.07
(45) IPCOH 1968 2310 2206 2030 2267 2299 1978 2425 1570 1889 2229 2574 1579 2574 2574 2562 2562 2455 2455 2435 2435 2192 2192 2192 2315 2421 2315 2315 2315 2571 1307 1917 1692 1692 1692 2524 1274 1274 1274 1274 2307 2551 1274 1112 2574 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable: Low.Ex. Up.Ext. % Sign. CDF(0) Beta StD.
INTRESERV -0.02 0.00 99.84 1.00 -0.010 0.002 GOVSPEND1 SAFRICA INTERESTS INFL1 TRADEUS REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.08 0.01 99.54 1.00 -0.031 0.007 INFL1 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS GTOT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
DEBTSERV -0.02 0.03 74.47 0.97 0.010 0.005 CURACC1 USBANKS INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 OECD INTERESTS
CURACC1 -0.07 0.03 70.86 0.96 -0.016 0.006 REVOL SAFRICA INTERESTS DEBT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
DEBT1 -0.01 0.01 41.83 0.86 0.001 0.001 DEFICIT1 STRIKES1 INTERESTS USBANKS OECD INTERESTS
GDPCAP1 -0.48 0.10 94.90 1.00 -0.177 0.040 USBANKS RULELAW INTERESTS TRADEUS SAFRICA REPUDIATION
INFL1 -0.02 0.01 8.96 0.57 -0.001 0.001 XRATE1 USBANKS ASIAE DEBT1 XRATE1 INTERESTS
XRATE1 -0.01 0.02 12.91 0.80 0.001 0.001 INFL1 DEFICIT1 INTERESTS INFL1 USBANKS OECD
DEFICIT1 -0.11 0.03 60.33 0.90 -0.020 0.010 GOVSPEND1 ASIAE INTERESTS DEBT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
GTOT1 -0.02 0.01 55.46 0.93 -0.005 0.003 GOVSPEND1 CORRUPT INTERESTS STRIKES1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
INVEST1 -0.05 0.03 69.15 0.96 -0.013 0.005 CURACC1 DEFICIT1 ASIAE GUERIL REPUDIATION INTERESTS
LIBOR -0.16 0.07 12.06 0.78 0.011 0.013 USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS DEBT1 SAFRICA CORRUPT
GOVSPEND1 -0.04 0.02 14.49 0.70 -0.004 0.004 DEFICIT1 TRADEUS INTERESTS GDPCAP1 USBANKS SAFRICA
YRSUNDER51 -0.28 0.77 87.22 0.99 0.300 0.095 DEFICIT1 BURQUAL INTERESTS DEFICIT1 ASSAS USBANKS
NRUNDER -0.03 0.04 47.35 0.80 -0.005 0.004 GOVSPEND1 YRSUNDER51 REVOL USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS
ELECEX -0.83 0.58 0.17 0.63 -0.046 0.126 GUERIL SAFRICA INTERESTS DEFICIT1 ELECLEG ETHNIC
ELECLEG -0.50 0.39 0.00 0.57 -0.023 0.097 USBANKS BURQUAL INTERESTS DEFICIT1 ELECLEGLEAD USBANKS
ELECEXLAG -0.56 0.49 0.00 0.55 -0.019 0.126 GOVSPEND1 ELECLEGLAG INTERESTS ELECLEGLAG USBANKS INTERESTS
ELECLEGLAG -0.33 0.57 7.41 0.78 0.087 0.096 GOVCHANGE USBANKS INTERESTS ELECEXLAG SAFRICA INTERESTS
ELECEXLEAD -0.43 0.62 0.00 0.55 0.022 0.126 ELECLEGLEAD GUERIL BURQUAL DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
ELECLEGLEAD -0.35 0.54 0.13 0.59 0.027 0.097 ELECEXLEAD ASSAS INTERESTS DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
ASSAS -0.21 0.06 18.11 0.92 -0.052 0.031 GOVCHANGE USBANKS RULELAW DEFICIT1 CRISES1 USBANKS
REVOL -0.47 0.31 0.00 0.58 -0.024 0.083 NRUNDER REPUDIATION INTERESTS DEFICIT1 GUERIL INTERESTS
GUERIL -0.45 0.39 0.03 0.65 -0.039 0.087 REPUDIATION IMFQUOTA INTERESTS ASSAS TRADEUS INTERESTS
CRISES1 -0.89 0.25 40.67 0.87 -0.184 0.103 GOVSPEND1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS CURACC1 ASSAS ASIAE
GOVCHANGE -0.46 0.91 1.05 0.77 0.113 0.139 GTOT1 ELECLEGLAG INTERESTS ASSAS OECD INTERESTS
DEMON1 -0.09 0.12 0.62 0.59 -0.004 0.020 YRSUNDER51 ELECEXLAG RIOTS1 DEBT1 ASSAS INTERESTS
STRIKES1 -0.12 0.34 4.86 0.84 0.065 0.057 GTOT1 YRSUNDER51 GOVCHANGE DEFICIT1 ASSAS TRADEUS
RIOTS1 -0.10 0.11 3.62 0.54 0.003 0.019 DEMON1 USBANKS INTERESTS CURACC1 DEBT1 DEMON1
EXCOMP -0.50 0.97 13.24 0.78 0.100 0.097 DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS REVOL TRADEUS INTERESTS
USBANKS -0.05 0.19 22.39 0.94 0.044 0.026 DEBTSERV YRSUNDER51 RELSIZE1 GDPCAP1 ASIAE RELSIZE1
TRADEUS -0.01 0.02 27.10 0.80 -0.003 0.003 INFL1 USBANKS BURQUAL DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
ASIAE -0.91 0.62 7.26 0.75 -0.128 0.143 INFL1 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS DEFICIT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
OECD -2.13 1.14 0.23 0.50 -0.045 0.326 GOVSPEND1 GUERIL USBANKS CURACC1 GDPCAP1 STRIKES1
SAFRICA -1.21 0.80 24.25 0.76 0.089 0.097 DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS USBANKS TRADEUS INTERESTS
LIBERAL -0.19 0.20 35.86 0.86 0.035 0.025 DEFICIT1 ASIAE INTERESTS ASSAS TRADEUS INTERESTS
CORRUPT -0.21 0.22 8.10 0.83 -0.046 0.042 CURACC1 DEFICIT1 USBANKS USBANKS BURQUAL INTERESTS
RULELAW -0.22 0.24 7.11 0.69 -0.025 0.040 GOVSPEND1 ASSAS USBANKS GUERIL REPUDIATION INTERESTS
REPUDIATION -0.26 0.00 99.97 1.00 -0.106 0.028 NRUNDER RULELAW INTERESTS GDPCAP1 ASSAS SAFRICA
BURQUAL -0.31 0.15 29.16 0.89 -0.066 0.042 USBANKS CORRUPT INTERESTS DEBT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
RELSIZE1 -1.11 0.73 3.91 0.60 0.033 0.105 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS IMFQUOTA REPUDIATION IMFQUOTA INTERESTS
IMFQUOTA -0.54 0.73 4.66 0.62 0.035 0.086 REPUDIATION RELSIZE1 INTERESTS USBANKS RELSIZE1 INTERESTS
ETHNIC -0.14 0.16 0.01 0.66 -0.014 0.032 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS TRADEUS GDPCAP1 REVOL INTERESTS
INTERESTS -0.01 0.01 3.30 0.56 0.000 0.002 INFL1 ASSAS LIBERAL DEFICIT1 USBANKS SAFRICA
IPCOH -0.33 0.28 0.60 0.68 -0.029 0.057 ASIAE BURQUAL INTERESTS ASSAS ASIAE INTERESTS
INFL1 -0.01 0.00 3.12 0.54 0.000 0.001 DEFICIT1 USBANKS REPUDIATION CURACC1 GDPCAP1 NRUNDER
INTRESERV -0.02 0.00 98.14 1.00 -0.009 0.002 GOVSPEND1 SAFRICA INTERESTS DEFICIT1 TRADEUS REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.09 0.01 99.54 1.00 -0.032 0.008 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS ETHNIC GTOT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
XRATE1 0.00 0.00 6.90 0.78 0.001 0.001 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS INTERESTS GDPCAP1 NRUNDER CRISES1
INTRESERV -0.02 0.00 99.84 1.00 -0.010 0.002 GOVSPEND1 SAFRICA INTERESTS GTOT1 TRADEUS REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.08 0.02 98.49 1.00 -0.027 0.007 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS ETHNIC GTOT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
Note: Each row is based upon 12,384 (Panel A) resp. 11,522 (Panels B, C1, C2) regressions
Table 1. Economic and political determinants of IMF credit: Extreme Bounds Analysis
(dependent variable: dummy indicating that a country receives IMF credit in particular year) 
Panel A: Base model
Panel C2: EBA for XRATE1 in case INFL1 not in Z-vector
Panel B: Other variables
Panel C1: EBA for INFL1 in case XRATE1 not in Z-vector
(7)
Variables in the model that yield the extreme:





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable: Low.Ex. Up.Ext. % Sign. CDF(0) Beta StD.
INTRESERV -0.02 0.00 99.86 1.00 -0.008 0.002 RIOTS1 SAFRICA INTERESTS TRADEUS SAFRICA REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.07 0.02 97.89 1.00 -0.027 0.007 CURACC1 DEFICIT1 USBANKS USBANKS ASIAE INTERESTS
DEBTSERV 0.00 0.07 99.79 1.00 0.026 0.005 GOVSPEND1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 USBANKS SAFRICA
CURACC1 -0.08 0.02 53.92 0.94 -0.013 0.006 DEFICIT1 USBANKS ASIAE DEBT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
DEBT1 0.00 0.01 37.68 0.86 0.001 0.001 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS REPUDIATION GUERIL OECD INTERESTS
GDPCAP1 -0.30 0.26 3.68 0.73 -0.030 0.042 DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS
INFL1 -0.01 0.02 7.50 0.62 0.000 0.001 XRATE1 RIOTS1 SAFRICA XRATE1 USBANKS INTERESTS
XRATE1 -0.01 0.01 20.66 0.75 0.001 0.001 INFL1 USBANKS INTERESTS INFL1 REVOL SAFRICA
DEFICIT1 -0.05 0.06 2.23 0.51 0.001 0.009 GOVSPEND1 RIOTS1 SAFRICA GOVSPEND1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
GTOT1 -0.02 0.01 19.80 0.75 -0.002 0.003 DEFICIT1 ETHNIC INTERESTS USBANKS ASIAE INTERESTS
INVEST1 -0.05 0.03 81.30 0.98 -0.016 0.006 CURACC1 GOVSPEND1 SAFRICA DEFICIT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
LIBOR -0.14 0.10 7.97 0.83 0.014 0.014 USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS YRSUNDER51 USBANKS RULELAW
GOVSPEND1 -0.03 0.02 0.29 0.58 -0.001 0.004 EXCOMP USBANKS INTERESTS DEFICIT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS
YRSUNDER51 0.04 1.11 100.00 1.00 0.641 0.104 ELECEXLAG ETHNIC INTERESTS DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS
NRUNDER -0.02 0.04 6.27 0.56 0.000 0.004 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS OECD ASSAS REPUDIATION INTERESTS
ELECEX -0.91 0.58 1.40 0.80 -0.133 0.138 USBANKS ETHNIC INTERESTS DEFICIT1 ELECLEG INTERESTS
ELECLEG -0.94 0.22 31.72 0.93 -0.186 0.106 ELECEX ETHNIC INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 ELECLEGLAG USBANKS
ELECEXLAG -0.28 1.09 97.06 1.00 0.385 0.128 DEFICIT1 ELECLEGLAG INTERESTS ELECLEGLEAD USBANKS INTERESTS
ELECLEGLAG -0.30 0.81 81.31 0.98 0.264 0.101 GTOT1 ELECEXLAG USBANKS DEFICIT1 BURQUAL INTERESTS
ELECEXLEAD -0.43 0.72 18.90 0.93 0.200 0.129 ELECLEGLEAD ETHNIC INTERESTS ELECEXLAG USBANKS INTERESTS
ELECLEGLEAD -0.30 0.65 2.62 0.80 0.102 0.102 ELECLEG ELECEXLEAD OECD ELECEXLAG USBANKS INTERESTS
ASSAS -0.28 0.10 0.03 0.58 -0.013 0.034 GOVSPEND1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS DEBTSERV GUERIL USBANKS
REVOL -0.32 0.50 0.53 0.73 0.059 0.087 NRUNDER REPUDIATION INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 ETHNIC INTERESTS
GUERIL -0.56 0.37 1.09 0.72 -0.070 0.094 USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS ASSAS TRADEUS INTERESTS
CRISES1 -0.94 0.27 39.94 0.90 -0.201 0.117 DEFICIT1 REPUDIATION INTERESTS DEFICIT1 ELECLEGLAG INTERESTS
GOVCHANGE -0.43 1.06 39.92 0.95 0.266 0.145 ELECLEGLAG CORRUPT INTERESTS USBANKS OECD INTERESTS
DEMON1 -0.08 0.13 0.08 0.53 -0.001 0.020 GTOT1 YRSUNDER51 BURQUAL DEFICIT1 RIOTS1 USBANKS
STRIKES1 -0.24 0.23 0.00 0.54 -0.007 0.060 INFL1 USBANKS ASIAE CURACC1 DEBT1 DEFICIT1
RIOTS1 -0.19 0.07 14.62 0.86 -0.031 0.023 DEMON1 USBANKS ASIAE DEBTSERV RELSIZE1 INTERESTS
EXCOMP -0.48 1.45 0.96 0.53 0.008 0.105 DEFICIT1 ASSAS LIBERAL GOVSPEND1 CORRUPT INTERESTS
USBANKS -0.10 0.18 2.29 0.77 0.024 0.028 DEBTSERV REVOL ETHNIC NRUNDER RELSIZE1 INTERESTS
TRADEUS -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.67 -0.001 0.003 REVOL ASIAE INTERESTS USBANKS CORRUPT INTERESTS
ASIAE -1.08 0.45 21.78 0.85 -0.233 0.161 USBANKS INTERESTS IPCOH DEBT1 INVEST1 ASSAS
OECD -1.77 1.36 0.00 0.53 -0.053 0.348 GTOT1 GOVCHANGE TRADEUS GTOT1 YRSUNDER51 GUERIL
SAFRICA -0.97 0.59 3.78 0.63 0.045 0.103 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS INTERESTS REVOL TRADEUS INTERESTS
LIBERAL -0.22 0.13 0.03 0.59 -0.008 0.027 USBANKS BURQUAL INTERESTS INFL1 ELECLEGLEAD INTERESTS
CORRUPT -0.16 0.33 1.04 0.79 0.042 0.046 DEFICIT1 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS REVOL BURQUAL INTERESTS
RULELAW -0.17 0.29 2.46 0.75 0.034 0.043 DEFICIT1 USBANKS ETHNIC REVOL REPUDIATION INTERESTS
REPUDIATION -0.22 0.07 21.47 0.91 -0.046 0.029 DEFICIT1 USBANKS INTERESTS DEBT1 INVEST1 LIBOR
BURQUAL -0.30 0.21 1.65 0.57 -0.012 0.044 DEFICIT1 CORRUPT INTERESTS DEBT1 REVOL INTERESTS
RELSIZE1 -1.21 0.60 4.83 0.80 -0.127 0.123 INFL1 USBANKS IMFQUOTA GOVSPEND1 IMFQUOTA INTERESTS
IMFQUOTA -0.72 0.62 5.71 0.70 -0.068 0.094 USBANKS CORRUPT INTERESTS CRISES1 USBANKS RELSIZE1
ETHNIC -0.06 0.23 48.47 0.96 0.067 0.034 DEFICIT1 YRSUNDER51 RIOTS1 USBANKS REPUDIATION INTERESTS
INTERESTS -0.01 0.01 16.43 0.91 -0.003 0.002 GOVSPEND1 USBANKS REPUDIATION CURACC1 GOVSPEND1 TRADEUS
IPCOH -0.20 0.38 8.53 0.79 0.057 0.060 ELECLEGLEAD OECD ETHNIC CRISES1 ASIAE INTERESTS
INFL1 -0.01 0.01 2.83 0.63 0.000 0.001 DEBTSERV GOVSPEND1 ETHNIC CURACC1 GDPCAP1 INTERESTS
INTRESERV -0.03 0.00 99.50 1.00 -0.012 0.002 ELECEXLAG USBANKS INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 TRADEUS REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.08 0.02 97.78 1.00 -0.035 0.008 DEBTSERV DEFICIT1 USBANKS GUERIL REPUDIATION INTERESTS
XRATE1 0.00 0.00 6.84 0.55 0.000 0.001 DEBTSERV GOVSPEND1 ETHNIC GDPCAP1 ASSAS INTERESTS
INTRESERV -0.03 0.00 99.85 1.00 -0.013 0.002 ELECEXLAG USBANKS INTERESTS GOVSPEND1 TRADEUS REPUDIATION
GGDP1 -0.08 0.02 97.96 1.00 -0.033 0.008 DEBTSERV DEFICIT1 USBANKS GUERIL REPUDIATION INTERESTS
Note: Each row is based upon 12,384 (Panel A) resp. 11,522 (Panels B, C1, C2) regressions
Panel C1: EBA for INFL1 in case XRATE1 not in Z-vector
Panel C2: EBA for XRATE1 in case INFL1 not in Z-vector
Lower bound: Upper bound:
Panel A: Base model
Panel B: Other variables
Table 2. Economic and political determinants of IMF involvement: Extreme Bounds Analysis
(dependent variable: dummy indicating that a country signed an agreement with the IMF in a particular year)
(7)
Variables in the model that yield the extreme: